Erring Conscience & Religious Freedom

Title: "The Erring Conscience and Freedom of Religion: Aquinas on Freedom of Conscience in Pluralistic Society"
Publication: Lex Naturalis: A Journal of Natural Law 5 (Fall 2020): 23–42. Previously presented at the Philosophy and Humanities Conference, Houston Community College, November 3–4, 2017.

Abstract

Today’s political landscape encourages freedom of conscience while maintaining the tolerance of pluralism. But can conscience be wrong? Pervasive emotivism in Western culture defines morality as an expression of opinion elevates conscience to the supreme status of being the only judge of morality. In this view, authenticity is the only criterion for morality and conscience is reduced to peace of mind or reassurance about one’s choices. This view of conscience ultimately undermines the possibility of maintaining basic shared values that are necessary for pluralism.

Contrary to the emotivist view, the objectivist view provides a clear and precise definition of conscience that encourages freedom of conscience as well as providing guidelines for its limits based upon a distinction between internal motivation and external objective morality. This position will be presented with recourse to Thomas Aquinas and his advocates as they allow for the possibility of an erring conscience that leaves room to grow and leaves room for society to judge right and wrong behavior. I will cover such questions such as the following: Can conscience be mistaken? Does an erring conscience impose moral obligation? Can doing the right action feel wrong? How can freedom of conscience be encouraged while providing safeguards against moral anarchy?