Title: Virtue Ethics in Kierkegaard
Conference: American Catholic Philosophical Association (Minneapolis, MN)
Abstract
There has been some debate whether Kierkegaard’s ethics should be interpreted as exhibiting a virtue ethic. John J. Davenport interprets Kierkegaard as presenting a teleology in human nature, as does classical virtue ethics, but with the end, or telos, being authenticity instead of the moral virtues constituting eudaimonia. Others, such as Norman Lillegard, interpret Kierkegaard as being a virtue ethicist that distinguishes between moral virtues and aesthetic virtues. Still others, like Philip Quinn, reject the thesis that Kierkegaard is a classical virtue ethicist in any sense, and others, like C. Stephen Evans and Robert C. Roberts interpret him as agreeing with classical virtue ethics and supplementing it with additional contributions. I will argue in sympathy with Evans and Roberts that Kierkegaard is compatible with classical virtue ethics. Three aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought will be considered: (1) passion and interestedness, (2) authenticity as an existential virtue, and (3) Christian character and practice in classical virtues.