Title: “The Moral Status of Intellectual Virtue in Thomas Aquinas"
Conference: Society of Christian Philosophers (Midwest Regional)
Location: Houston Baptist University, Houston, TX
Abstract
The rise of virtue epistemology has challenged the division of intellectual and moral virtue held by Aristotle and Aquinas. Aquinas held that intellectual virtues were non-moral habits of the mind. Linda Zagzebski, Robert C. Roberts, and other modern critics contend that intellectual activity does have a moral status. Aquinas’s distinction between intellectual and moral virtues may be shown to address the concerns of his critics while maintaining the need for the distinction. In this paper, I address two challenges proposed by Zagzebski and supported by others.
(1) First, critics claim that intellectual and moral virtue do not fundamentally differ in their character. Zagzebski explains that a virtue is moral whether or not it is applied in intellectual contexts. She defines intellectual virtue in reference to epistemic function that involves both reason and emotion while Aquinas defines intellectual and moral virtue in reference to their respective powers and objects. The intellectual power is actualized by excellent epistemic habits that successfully obtain the object of truth, but knowledge does not imply goodness, “For even the demons believe and tremble.” Instead, moral virtues actualize the appetitive power (will) in the acquisition of goodness. Because goodness and truth are distinct, so are their respective powers and virtues.
(2) Second, Zagzebski claims that the intellect and will do not function independently. All thinking involves feeling. Aquinas agrees because he explains that in an actual choice the will is the efficient cause of a choice, and the intellect provides its final cause. Nevertheless, excellent epistemic habits do not imply moral goodness because agents can direct the indifferent act of epistemic success to either good or evil ends.