Title: “Thomistic Compatibilism and Sufficient Reason"
Conference: American Catholic Philosophical Association
Location: Dallas, TX

Abstract

Aquinas’s discussion of free-will admits of causal influences. In reconciling freedom and causation, libertarians and compatibilists interpret Aquinas differently. I argue that Aquinas is loosely compatibilist and his model benefits from the additional consideration of the principle of sufficient reason.

Aquinas explains that freedom includes the ability to do otherwise. Why does an agent choose otherwise? To answer, I will (1) first map Aquinas’s philosophy of mind and explain how Aquinas’s model narrows the discussion to one particular ambiguity concerning how the ability to choose otherwise relates to causation. (2) Second, I show that Aquinas’s answer leaves a gap in the discussion that allows for both libertarian and compatibilist interpretations, each requiring a supplemental consideration. (3) Third, I propose that Aquinas’s gap may be filled with the principle of sufficient reason as the best explanation of the relationship between causality and freedom.